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How relevant are prominent Western notions of social 
cohesion to emerging democratic nation-states? 
Classic studies on neighbourhood civility focus on the 
importance of voluntarism and civic participation in 
local associations.1 In a country such as South Africa 
(in the global South) the question of neighbourliness 
refers to a different set of challenges that concern 
surviving poverty and immediate defence of life 
against imminent violence. 
The aim of this article is to understand urban violence 
in South Africa in the context of local and international 
engagements, with the concept of social cohesion 
and collective efficacy as factors that can potentially 
The concept of social cohesion is increasingly being utilised in local and international policy discourse and 
scholarship. The idea of collective efficacy, defined as ‘social cohesion among neighbours combined with their 
willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good’, has been posited as having an important protective 
effect against violence. This article investigates the relevance of international framings of social cohesion and 
collective efficacy, which have largely been conceptualised and tested in the global North, to the conditions of 
social life and violence prevention in a city in the global South. These circumstances are interrogated through 
an ethnographic study conducted in Khayelitsha township in the Western Cape, where a major internationally 
funded and conceptualised violence prevention intervention, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading 
(VPUU), has been implemented. The ethnographic material contests some of the key assumptions in 
international discourses on social cohesion and the manner in which social cohesion has been interpreted and 
effected in the violence prevention initiatives of the VPUU.  
‘protect’ communities against violence at a 
neighbourhood level. 
The analysis is based on a multi-year international 
comparative study on the relationship between social 
cohesion and violence conducted in South Africa and 
Brazil, funded by the Canadian International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) Safe and 
Inclusive Cities Programme. 
This article focuses on the ethnographic material 
gathered as part of the study during 10 months of 
fieldwork in the South African township of Khayelitsha 
in the Western Cape, which experiences high levels 
of violence and poverty and is the site of a major, 
internationally funded, violence prevention 
intervention called ‘Violence Prevention through 
Urban Upgrading’ (VPUU). An ethnographic 
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methodology was utilised because it allows an 
understanding of the meanings, beliefs, values and 
practices of social actors and tries to understand 
human experience on its own terms, rather than 
judging it from a normative position.2 The article 
seeks to interrogate formal discourses around social 
cohesion and violence prevention in relation to an 
examination of the ‘lived’ experience of citizens as 
revealed by the ethnography. 
Background
Social cohesion is a broad concept but generally 
refers to the factors that ‘hold a society together’, 
which has been the focus of philosophical and social 
inquiry since the time of Aristotle, Aquinas and 
Montaigne, and in the sociology of Durkheim in the 
19th century. Collective efficacy looks at how social 
cohesion can prevent violence when it is translated 
into collective action for the ‘common good’ at 
neighbourhood level.3 
Historically, the greatest levels of concern with social 
cohesion have been at moments of major change, for 
example during the period of industrialisation, which 
Durkheim saw as undermining social cohesion.  More 
contemporary challenges and fragmentation 
associated with globalisation have precipitated a 
renewed interest in social cohesion as a policy 
construct from the 1990s. 
The concept of social cohesion has been widely used 
in the international policy environment and has been 
taken up within forums such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the Club of 
Rome and the Canadian federal government since 
the 1990s.
In South Africa, engagement with the concept 
through government policy has grown substantially 
over the past decade,4 which saw the launch of a 
national social cohesion strategy in 2012.5 ‘Social 
cohesion’ is now a major outcome in the country’s 
medium-term strategic framework for national 
development.6 
Thus far, however, there has been limited empirical 
research on social cohesion and its relationship to 
violence in the global South, particularly in new 
democratic nation-states such as South Africa. Policy 
and practical interventions by multi-lateral institutions, 
including the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), are formulated on 
the basis of understandings of social solidarity 
conceptualised in settings such as Europe and Canada.
The few existing academic studies in South Africa have 
identified a clear need for empirical research on the 
specific meaning of social cohesion in the South African 
environment7 and have noted the ‘scanty and 
anecdotal’ scholarship on the South African social 
fabric.8 On the policy front, a major study in 2011 
conducted for the Presidency strongly asserted the 
need for locally appropriate indicators to measure social 
cohesion.9
‘Social cohesion’ is a complex and multi-faceted 
concept, and a significant difficulty tackled by the 
scholarly research has been to define its scope.10 
However, most policy and scholarly research focuses 
on one or several of five dimensions identified by 
Jenson: (1) the sharing of common values, feelings of 
belonging; (2) economic inclusion and opportunities to 
participate in the labour market; (3) participation in 
public affairs, local and national; (4) tolerance of 
differences and diversity; and (5) legitimacy of 
institutions, in particular how well they are able to 
represent citizens and mediate conflict.11 
Thus far, most policy and scholarly literature utilises the 
concept to understand how to integrate all members of 
the national community into a well-established and 
relatively cohesive democratic nation-state. However, 
newly democratised nation-states such as South Africa 
face a more fundamental challenge: how to establish a 
socially unified democratic nation-state in the first place, 
often after individuals and communities have been 
deeply divided by generations of violence and socio-
political conflict. This remains a deeply complex and 
fraught task in post-colonial societies that are in general 
endemically heterogeneous. In such environments 
social pluralism may be devalued as a desire to 
establish national forms of identity, and statehood takes 
precedence. Vitally, the question of social cohesion in 
these recently established democratic nation-states is a 
profoundly political one; it involves establishing the 
terms of citizenship in a democratic nation-state based 
on ‘fraternity’ or community between citizens rather 
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than on an authoritarian relationship between state 
and citizen.12
The majority of empirical research attempting to 
measure social cohesion or advocating a way to 
measure it employs survey data that are readily 
available only in the United States (US) and Western 
Europe, and increasingly, Australasia. More 
importantly, many indicators used to ‘measure’ social 
solidarity currently are premised on notions of 
‘civic-ness’, ‘neighbourliness’ and ‘moral community’ 
that characterise the relatively orderly conditions of 
society in North America and Western Europe, rather 
than the far more tenuous conditions of local and 
national unity in countries such as South Africa. 
Here, the most basic legitimacy of state institutions is 
at stake. Participation may involve immediate defence 
of life, for example, defending neighbours against 
violent attack, while a sense of national or even local 
belonging remains intensely problematic. From this 
perspective the very meaning of the dimensions of 
social cohesion that current research attempts to 
measure may be profoundly different in the global 
North and South. 
In addition, the literature on social cohesion has been 
shaped by particular theoretical assumptions about 
the nature of social solidarity and social life. 
Durkheim’s teleological arguments that as societies 
modernise, they move from communitarian forms of 
solidarity to solidarity built around relationships 
between autonomous individuals, have been 
particularly influential. The hypothesis of collective 
efficacy, which is now widely used in criminological 
theory, influentially defined by Sampson as ‘social 
cohesion among neighbours combined with their 
willingness to intervene on behalf of the common 
good’, uses data from Chicago in the US and 
envisages individualised, independent subjects 
choosing to come together for the good of a 
particular community.13  
Yet, in environments such as South Africa where 
communitarian social relations and identities are still 
prevalent, such forms of mutual interaction are an 
assumed part of social life rather than an individual 
‘choice’ in the manner envisaged in Western 
contractarian thought. As an interviewee in 
Khayelitsha explained, ‘individualism is in the head it 
is not in the blood’.14 These conceptions are strongly 
linked to the ethics of ubuntu that both implicitly and 
explicitly structure social life and identity in 
environments such as South Africa. Ubuntu, an Nguni 
word, signifies a complex concept that is not easily 
translated into English but nevertheless has a 
profound impact on African ontology across the 
continent. In terms of this ethics, ethical personhood, 
as opposed to mere existence, is realised through the 
collective, and by means of actively carrying out 
duties and obligations to kin and community.15 
Khayelitsha: a case study 
Methods 
To investigate how social relations and cohesion are 
understood – and produced – by social actors 
themselves and to compare this to formal discourses 
around social cohesion, the research utilised an 
ethnographic methodology. Ethnography seeks to 
interpret the meanings located in particular social and 
cultural systems.16 Geertz argues that social actors 
are suspended in ‘webs of significance’ that they 
themselves create and sustain meaningful and stable 
social relationships with each other because they 
share those common understandings of reality.17
Therefore this research did not attempt a quantitative 
analysis of violence, social cohesion or the impact of 
the VPUU intervention on both of these factors. 
Instead it sought to understand the context of 
violence and social cohesion in Khayelitsha and the 
meanings attributed to the VPUU in this milieu.  
The fieldwork was carried out by research team 
member Ncedo Mngqibisa over a period of 10 
months. He immersed himself in the communities 
living in the Harare and Kuyasa sections of 
Khayelitsha by conducting daily field visits that 
allowed him to produce a ‘thick description’18 of the 
‘way of being’19 of these communities through 
semi-structured interviews, focus groups, informal 
conversations and ongoing systematic observations, 
which were recorded in field notes. All interactions 
probed questions about the way in which people do 
and do not cooperate in Khayelitsha, forms of social 
and other organisation, the degree of sociality 
between neighbours, experiences and norms around 
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violence, and local responses to violence, including 
both formal interventions such as the VPUU and 
informal activities such as community patrols and 
vigilante action. 
Interviewees were identified through a ‘snowball 
sampling’ methodology that gave the researcher 
deepening access to different components of the 
community. Snowball sampling is particularly useful 
for accessing ‘hidden’20 or more ‘vulnerable’ and 
‘impenetrable’21 social groups. The research began 
with a process of community profiling that involved 
identifying and interviewing key community leaders 
from local government, civil society, schools and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While 
every effort was made to speak to a range of role 
players with different perspectives, a snowball 
sampling approach does introduce the possibility of 
bias as a result of the fact that the methodology 
depends on referral from one interviewee to another, 
who are almost inevitably linked within social or 
other networks. 
The research on the VPUU was constrained by the 
fact that the HSRC was unable to secure formal 
cooperation with the intervention, although this was 
the initial intention of the research project. Therefore 
this study relies on the perspectives of those who 
interacted with the intervention and what publicly 
available documentation we could obtain.  
Through a process of engagement with the 
Khayelitsha community in Harare and Kuyasa, 
informal traders emerged as a group who had a 
significant level of engagement with and stake in the 
VPUU intervention and hence were interviewed 
systematically, both individually and in a focus group. 
Another focus group was held with informal traders 
who are foreign nationals to gain their perspective of 
informal trading in the township. In addition, focus 
groups were held with beneficiaries of the VPUU 
social development programme who had received 
funding from the organisation for community-based 
projects, as well as with young entrepreneurs who 
had been using VPUU facilities such as the ‘Hub’ 
business development space. Finally, focus groups 
were held with young men and young women 
respectively to draw out the gendered dimensions of 
violence in Khayelitsha. 
Recordings of a total of 58 interviews and six focus 
groups were translated into English by a professional 
translator, combined with Mngqibisa’s field notes and 
commentary on the key research issues of the study. 
The qualitative material was analysed using inductive 
thematic analysis. This process consists of reading 
through textual data, identifying themes in the data, 
coding those themes, and then interpreting the 
structure and content of the themes.22 The analysis 
also drew on grounded theory, which is a type of 
inductive thematic analysis. Developed by Glaser and 
Strauss,23 grounded theory is a set of iterative 
techniques designed to identify categories and 
concepts within texts that are then linked into formal 
theoretical models.24 This method made it possible to 
‘read’ the different sources of data collected against 
each other in an ongoing recursive analysis. 
Social cohesion in Khayelitsha
Khayelitsha is the country’s second largest township. 
It is characterised by severe levels of violence and 
poverty. The township experiences some of the 
highest murder rates in the country, currently at a ratio 
of between 76 and 108 murders per 100 000 of the 
population at different police stations in the area.25 
This is well above the national murder rate of 32 
murders per 100 000 of the population, which is 
already five times higher than the 2013 global average 
of six murders per 100 000.26
The ethnography shows pervasive levels of fear of 
violence in public and private spaces. A young woman 
explained that ‘we cannot walk outside at night 
because of the fear. You fear being raped, robbed, 
I don’t know if I will get to where I am going alive or 
if I will be killed on my way.’27 Private spaces are 
also contaminated: 
You can’t really sleep at night even when you are 
with the person you are in a relationship with. 
During our mothers’ and grandmothers’ times 
they felt safe when they were with their men. You 
only feel safe under your roof and even there you 
need to lock. You have to sleep with airtime on 
your phone so you can call for help.28
There is also considerable youth gang violence. 
Residents feel ‘robbed by our children that we gave 
birth to in the township’.29
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Khayelitsha is also marked by substantial economic 
disadvantage, with the average income of those 
employed not more than R2 000 per month and half 
of the population living in shacks or informal 
dwellings. Khayelitsha was one of the last townships 
established under apartheid and was intended to 
forcibly ‘consolidate’ the settlement of black people in 
the urban areas of the Western Cape.30 
Throughout its history it has experienced significant 
migration, particularly from the largely poor, rural 
province of the Eastern Cape. Currently about 50% of 
the adult population come from this province, 
although young people below 19 have largely been 
born in the township.31 Khayelitsha has therefore 
developed from a ‘previously planned township area 
under apartheid into a sprawling, largely informal 
urban area characterised by a lack of basic services 
and infrastructure where over-crowding and 
inadequate living conditions prevail for the vast 
majority of its residents’.32 While high levels of 
migration do not automatically lead to higher levels of 
violence, rapid migration, particularly when it is not 
well managed by the state, can place strains on 
existing social bonds and local forms of regulation.33  
The analysis of the ethnographic data shows that 
Khayelitsha does not experience an absence of social 
cohesion but, like many South African townships, is 
characterised by dense informal social networks and 
multiple forms of social ordering and social 
organisation, founded implicitly on communitarian 
ethics and social practice. 
I think it’s a cultural thing to know everyone.34 
One of the things most of us grew up with is 
that the neighbour is also your mom or dad. 
If your parents are at work, they normally 
take care of us and play the role of a parent. 
When celebrating things we do it together as 
a community. I’d say that if you are living in the 
township it is hard to say you don’t know your 
neighbour unless if you are new.35
Informal traders explain: ‘We trust each other. If 
someone has a problem they can approach the other 
person for help.’36 ‘We are tight in this area.’37 People 
do intervene on each other’s behalf: ‘We don’t have 
securities. My security is this one and that one [other 
traders] … If we get robbed or I am being robbed, 
these securities you see here have to come out to 
help me.’38 However, many of these networks are also 
under pressure. ‘People no longer have ubuntu’.39 
Class divisions undermine cohesion: ‘Greeting the 
neighbour is fine, but it is not alright to ask for sugar 
from a neighbour that is in a higher level than you.’40 
In addition, ‘Western ways of living’ are ‘influencing 
people on how they should live’41 and undermining 
communitarian values and practices.
Although networks can be a source of resilience, they 
can also be a source of violent exclusion and control, 
manifested in group violence against a precariously 
defined ‘other’. Here neighbours are extraordinarily 
willing to intervene on each other’s behalf; however, 
the ‘common good’ they seek to achieve is often the 
violent exclusion of the criminal and the momentary 
restoration of ‘order’.
A trader outlined: ‘Most of the time, Xosh is not at her 
stand. The skollies go to Xosh’s stand and take 
whatever they want. I have to stop the fights. If the 
person runs, they [community members] chase the 
person with a knife.’42 Another trader reiterated that 
he is prepared to risk his life and face lethal gun 
violence to defend other traders: ‘We don’t care 
about the gun and dying.’43
Violence is frequently organised as a public spectacle, 
a performance of moral community, as the following 
field report of a spontaneous armed gathering at a 
shop owned by a Chinese national accused of 
mistreating a worker indicates. ‘It was roughly around 
lunch time when I saw people amalgamated in front 
of the Chinese 5 Rand store, carrying stones, 
umbrellas and brooms from the toilets in the mall ... 
People claimed that Chinese treat their workers 
[badly] and they … were singing that they must go 
back to China.’44
One of the classic indicators of social cohesion is ‘Do 
you recognise people in your neighbourhood?’ People 
in Khayelitsha ‘know’ each other but this ‘knowing’ 
can be a source of violent retribution. Those who are 
identified as ‘criminals’ may be subjected to violent 
public punishment. A former gang member explained 
that ‘our utmost fear is not going to jail or dying but 
it’s the torture by the community should they find 
you’.45 Those who report crime are known to those 
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who commit crime. These individuals often have 
networks with local police. A female focus group 
participant explained why she does not report drug 
dealing: ‘I don’t report it because I fear for my life … if 
I go and report … at the police station, the police will 
get to that house and tell on me.’46
While traditional crime prevention approaches are 
premised on utilising community knowledge, in this 
situation ‘knowing’ can be dangerous. The concept 
of collective action and a willingness to intervene on 
behalf of a ‘common good’, which underpins 
international definitions of collective efficacy, therefore 
takes an ambiguous turn in environments where the 
nature of the common good is profoundly contested 
and parochial conceptions of it are violently defended. 
In this setting, citizens often have an ambiguous 
relationship with the state, law and legality and 
conventional forms of regulation. For example, one 
interviewee, referring to constitutional provisions for 
the rights of women and children, asserted that ‘the 
government has destroyed this country with the laws 
they set’.47 The police occupy a precarious and weak 
position in this world of informality. A respondent 
stated in this regard that ‘they [police] are defeated’.48 
Associations of minibus taxi drivers, the main form of 
transport for many South Africans, play a central 
regulatory function in Khayelitsha. This emerges from 
a history of informal regulation and social control that 
developed in townships as a result of the absence of 
legitimate governance under apartheid. In many ways 
taxi associations are a more influential presence than 
the police, and are well known for their use of 
coercive force. Taxi drivers act as informal police who 
‘discipline’ young people, act against criminals, even 
control informal economic relations, and often mete 
out significant violence. There appears to be at least 
some sanction for the violence of taxi associations, 
although the parents of young people alleged to be 
gang members who are beaten up by taxi drivers do 
not support their violence. A young schoolgirl argued 
that ‘taxi drivers help reduce the incidences of gang 
war by fighting fire with fire’.49 
The violence of taxi drivers is partly a response to the 
widespread youth gang problem in the township 
where schoolgoing boys, armed with knives and 
guns, are shaping the nature and meaning of public 
space. This includes parks built through urban 
upgrading, and the institutional space of the school, 
as this quote illustrates: ‘A fight had broken in the 
boys’ bathrooms [at school] and knives were drawn 
… so now the boys who drew knives for each other 
went to their gangs and now it’s no longer one on 
one but gang versus gang.’50  
The gangs impose their own form of policing and 
social order, which involves the territorial control of 
space. They overturn generational hierarchies, for 
example, taking control of the space of the school to 
pursue gang conflicts and threatening teachers with 
violence. A schoolgirl emphasised that ‘those 
teachers who don’t have cars are in big trouble 
because they can be attacked easily’.51 In a world of 
deprivation and violence, however, gangs can play 
an important role in the lives of young men. A gang 
member outlined his motivations for belonging to a 
gang: ‘It is also wanting to be part of a group of guys 
who are cool (amajita) because it gives you two 
things, status and protection.’52 
Therefore, in this setting, localised forms of cohesion 
that help residents cope with rampant crime and 
violence through vigilante associations and public 
violence actually undermine national social cohesion 
founded on constitutional values, by asserting an 
alternative, parochial regime of collective justice and 
punishment that disputes the values and practices of 
a universal and individualised, rights-based, formal 
law. The violent expression of this local justice 
contests the sovereignty of the state, which is 
ostensibly founded on a monopoly of the use of 
force in the country. 
Violence Prevention through Urban 
Upgrading (VPUU)
In order to address some of the challenges of 
violence and poverty experienced in Khayelitsha, the 
VPUU initiative was established through a 
partnership between the City of Cape Town and the 
German Development Bank in 2004. The 
intervention aims to reduce violence and improve the 
quality of life in Khayelitsha. The VPUU is primarily an 
urban upgrading programme, but it links this to 
‘work streams’ that support social and institutional 
crime prevention. 
23SA Crime QuArterly No. 55 • mAr 2016
The project endeavours to create a sense of ‘place’ 
and ownership of space through aesthetic and 
practical upgrading interventions that attempt to 
address the history of Khayelitsha as a mere 
catchment area for labour under apartheid. In 
addition, it seeks to provide support for local 
entrepreneurship, training in the management of 
facilities and support for community policing. It has 
made sizeable contributions to infrastructure 
development, initially in the Harare area of 
Khayelitsha and increasingly in other areas of the 
township. It is also being rolled out to a number of 
other places in the Western Cape. 
While the VPUU argues that it is a ‘technical’ 
intervention, it is in fact a deeply socially and 
culturally embedded undertaking, which disrupted, 
interacted with and shaped existing forms of social 
relation and social cohesion in the environments in 
which it was implemented. 
The VPUU ‘model’ draws substantially from 
international development models, particularly those 
of UN-Habitat, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and, most importantly, the German Development 
Bank. The bank’s model of ‘violence prevention 
through urban upgrading’ informs German financial 
cooperation with countries such as South Africa. This 
model explicitly seeks to address violence by using 
‘conventional urban planning tools’ and ‘coherent 
and integrated town planning’ in order to create an 
ordered and managed urban environment that 
bridges ‘the divide between the formal and the 
informal city’ and ‘stabilise[s] the social 
environment’.53 Urban upgrading in this perspective 
creates the foundation for new forms of citizenship 
based on physical and symbolic ownership of space. 
‘For inhabitants, having an official address means 
formally being resident of a city’, which ostensibly 
leads to a reduction in violence.54 Nonetheless, as 
Muggah notes in terms of the relationship between 
violence and urban upgrading, ‘the outcomes of 
slum upgrading are still highly contested with some 
observers detecting varying socio-economic 
dividends for the urban poor’.55
In addition, cities in the global South are a particularly 
complex and often deeply informal environment that 
may not lend themselves easily to traditional 
approaches of formalisation, regulation and 
upgrading. Swilling and Annecke note that cities in 
general are the outcomes of complex interactions of 
various socio-political, cultural, institutional and 
technical networks and that the urban environment is 
often characterised by contradictory processes of 
routinisation, repetitive crises and transformational 
practices.56 The peculiarities of southern cities are the 
result of their history of colonialism and post-
colonialism, as well as contemporary processes of 
rapid urbanisation and globalisation. In this 
environment, ‘illegality and informality tug at the 
normative roots of the state leading to an arena 
charged with the violence of and toward the 
governed’.57 Consequently, while the traditional urban 
planning approach to the city foresees the possibility 
of a significantly planned and regularised environment 
that could ostensibly ‘design out’ violence, the 
empirical ‘reality’ of most cities, particularly in the 
global South, involves a range of contradictory 
practices and processes that make this ideal very 
difficult to attain, even if it were desirable.
Nevertheless, the image of an ‘ordered’ city, founded 
on the model of European and American 
urbanisation, remains the primary conceptual framing 
for development interventions such as those funded 
by the German Development Bank and implemented 
by the VPUU in Khayelitsha. In this vision of the city, 
urban planners favour formality, order and 
modernisation in order to promote an international 
urbanism that is associated with the vision of a 
modern city as ‘hygienic’, sanitary and ‘respectable’. 
Often informality is misunderstood and misrecognised 
as a result of normative notions of ‘rational’ economic 
behaviour and values.58 Therefore, while informality 
may be cast as ‘irrational’ in these discourses, 
various types of informality are in fact embedded in a 
complex of local norms, forms of regulation and 
sociality that structure daily life in ways that are both 
meaningful and ‘rational’. 
The VPUU is fundamentally influenced by these 
international development policy discourses that seek 
to create a managed society, characterised by 
ordered and economised social relations and 
founded on a normative conception of a formalised 
city and the self-regulating, economic-rational actor. 
As a senior VPUU manager explained at the 
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Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry: ‘What the 
programme would like to show over time is the 
increase in what we would call managed urban areas 
and the map on the left with the orange dots shows 
the very few areas that were effectively managed.’59 
This is a vision that is profoundly contested by the 
material reality of informal norms of regulation and 
control in the fluid space of Khayelitsha, where local 
colloquial networks often have a far more significant 
social and symbolic resonance than formal 
institutional networks. In this context official and 
‘everyday’ networks co-exist and interact with each 
other, creating overlapping rings of authority and 
governance in what Shearing and Wood have called 
the ‘pluralization of the governance of security’.60 
The ethnographic fieldwork evidences some of the 
struggles by the VPUU to mediate the formal-informal 
divide and to ‘super-impose’ a model of order on a 
deeply contested, informal space. In this space the 
state is accepted if it provides services, but not if it 
tries to assert its authority. Here some of the most 
resonant forms of social regulation are violent and 
outside the state. Here the lines between what is 
legal, illegal, criminal or not are blurred, and informal 
businesses operate according to rationales that do 
not adhere to normative business practices. In this 
environment ‘scientific’ models developed by global 
organisations struggle to embed themselves in forms 
of sociality and governance that are far more deeply 
rooted, and which dispute the normative 
underpinnings of these interventions.
The VPUU has responded to this challenge by trying 
to create an explicitly ‘apolitical’, technical 
intervention in terms of both who implements (a 
consulting company) and how the intervention takes 
place. The initial financing agreement between the 
German Development Bank and the City of Cape 
Town stipulated that a ‘project-implementing agent’ 
or intermediary, known as the VPUU Consortium, 
should implement the intervention, led by a team of 
consultants from Sun Development Pty., which is a 
subsidiary of a company headquartered in Germany.61 
The intervention thus avoids direct implementation 
through existing local government or non-
governmental structures.
The ethnography reveals that while the VPUU 
characterises itself as ‘apolitical’ in terms of a lack of 
allegiance to any particular party, it is deeply invested 
in regimes of power at both local and city levels. Also, 
at the same time as the VPUU asserts the ‘apolitical’ 
nature of its work in the township of Khayelitsha, the 
intervention claims and receives notable political 
support from the City of Cape Town and is 
institutionally located in the City of Cape Town 
Mayoral Office, giving it substantial political sanction. 
The VPUU argues that its ‘apolitical’ approach has 
assisted it to achieve community trust in 
circumstances of high political contestation and 
anger at lack of government service delivery in 
Khayelitsha. It is also intended to facilitate equal 
participation in development without the 
contamination of political party patronage and is seen 
to give the intervention the ability to move freely in 
different environments without being seen as aligned 
any party or faction.62 
The VPUU sees social cohesion and social capital as 
central to its approach. The organisation states that it 
draws on ‘South American models’ that focus on the 
building of community cohesion and social capital.63 
Social capital, which can be defined as ‘networks of 
social relations that may provide individuals and 
groups with access to resources and supports’64 
plays a contributory role in building social cohesion. 
The main means through which the VPUU asserts 
that it builds social cohesion is community 
participation in development. It argues that it has 
engaged in a participatory methodology that ‘strives 
for negotiated solutions in cooperation with 
communities’, which it sees as having been a crucial 
success factor for the intervention that has helped 
build social cohesion in Khayelitsha.65 
However, Piper has called the form of community 
consultation that the VPUU engages in and the 
forums it creates as ‘designed’ in ways that allow for 
a very limited form of direct citizen participation in 
democratic decision-making.66 Instead, what is 
created is a representative democracy model led by a 
cohort of ‘responsible’ leadership designated and 
socialised by the VPUU, whose function is to ensure 
the interests of the project by representing 
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who should participate in the structure, based on a 
range of criteria. Establishing such structures under 
the tutelage of the VPUU is intended to prevent any 
one stakeholder from gaining too much power over 
the development process and to avert the real threat 
that development processes might be captured for 
party political or other narrow interests. 
In as much as the VPUU seeks to manage who will 
participate in its ‘decision-making’ structures, its 
implementation is steeped in a managerialist discourse 
and practice that will only acknowledge those citizens 
who conform to these norms; i.e., the classic neo-
liberal, self-governing, ‘responsible’ citizen. One 
example of this is the set of procedures that must be 
followed by Community Policing Forums (CPFs) in 
order to receive financial support from the VPUU. 
Modelling its contractual relationship with CPFs on 
formal business conventions, the organisation seeks 
to conclude ‘service level agreements’ with CPFs that 
involve a number of pre-conditions, including that each 
CPF must have ‘accurate data about their 
membership and who is active and where they are 
active’ (own emphasis).71 Secondly, each active 
member of a neighbourhood watch must submit an 
incident report at the end of their duties. In addition, 
each CPF must enter into a ‘development contract’ 
with individual volunteers.72 ‘Standards’ have to be 
agreed to on each of these tasks and ‘if the CPF 
performs to standard they get the money into their 
account’.73 However, when questioned about the 
success of these contracts with CPFs, a senior 
VPUU manager acknowledged that ‘up until now only 
the Harare CPF has actually received payments so 
it’s not something that has been that successful up 
until now’.74 
In contrast to this ideal procedural model that the 
VPUU seeks to realise, is an example of what is seen 
as ‘inappropriate’ behaviour. It was recorded in a 
neighbourhood watch report, but is in fact a mundane 
form of interaction in the environment of Khayelitsha:
Incident report: ‘We met X, Y and Z, they were 
carrying big stones. We asked them why. The 
people started swearing and shouting at us and 
throwing the stones at us. We started throwing 
the stones back at them. X was hit and fell down. 
We called a van to check on him.’75
stakeholders chosen by the VPUU, rather than being 
directly accountable to the general citizenry. 
One of the key citizen engagement tools that the 
VPUU uses is baseline surveys, which the 
organisation discursively constructs as giving a 
‘voice’ to ‘ordinary’ citizens through a random 
sample. Therefore, ‘although one person in 10 
speaks, what they say will be an accurate reflection 
of what everyone living there would say’.67 This is an 
ostensibly neutral manner of collecting all ‘voices’: 
‘it’s a way of ensuring that we get an opinion which is 
independent of any other kind of gate keeping 
structures or political affiliations which are in place, so 
that the voice of the community can emerge’.68 
However, what can be ‘said’ in a survey is already 
pre-determined. Which communities can emerge in 
this putatively ‘apolitical’ space is also unclear. The 
baseline surveys that the VPUU conducts collect 
largely demographic information, which is valuable in 
its own right but cannot be claimed as a means of 
giving ‘voice’ to citizens and is far removed from the 
type of deliberative voice that Habermas envisaged in 
his model of a public sphere, that is, ‘an arena in 
which individuals participate in discussions about 
matters of common concern’.69 
In order to avoid the contestation and patronage of 
local politics, the VPUU therefore creates its own 
parallel, managed governance spaces oriented to 
ensure the delivery of development objectives 
through controlled community participation. However, 
as a ‘community participation work-stream manager’ 
acknowledged, a major challenge in establishing the 
organisation’s structures at local level has been trying 
to explain to communities why the VPUU is setting up 
completely new representative structures.70
The major decision-making forums for the project at 
local level are Safe Node Area Committees (SNAC). 
the VPUU argues that these are more representative 
and democratic than current local governance 
structures, allowing for the equal participation of a 
range of stakeholders. The SNAC is thus made up of 
50% of stakeholders coming from local government 
structures and 50% from community-based 
organisations, NGOs and faith-based organisations. 
The VPUU conducts an audit in a particular area and 
interviews the leadership of organisations to decide 
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Informal traders
A pivotal site where tensions have emerged between 
the formality that the VPUU seeks to create and local 
practices of informality, relates to contestation around 
the creation of formal kiosks for trading by the VPUU. 
The VPUU seeks to create a classic Western 
‘entrepreneur’ – the self-interested, utility-maximising 
individual whose major rationale is the generation of 
profit. Therefore, the formalisation that the VPUU 
wants to achieve as the basis of a more ‘ordered’ 
and controlled urban environment is not simply about 
infrastructure but about creating citizens with a 
particular subjectivity, which is contested by traders’ 
existing norms, world views and forms of social 
practice. As one trader noted: ‘We do want 
development, we do want the good and glamorous 
things, but the VPUU needs to know the people they 
are bringing this development to.’76 
The VPUU therefore enforces a range of business 
principles and practices that are seen as alien and 
exclusionary. ‘They come with a list of criteria’;74 ‘they 
tell you that your business should have a business 
account and business plan … their requirements 
keep you out’.77 At the same time the VPUU is itself 
seen to be engaging in ‘business’ rather than 
development as a result of the fact that charges are 
levied for the use of its facilities. 
While on the one hand the kiosks the VPUU has built 
provide important services, e.g. access to water, 
electricity and storage space, at the same time the 
initiative is seen as undermining pre-existing 
relationships of sociality and reciprocity that 
underpinned survivalist businesses, where relations 
between traders were governed horizontally and 
informally. ‘It’s better to sell different things. Business 
will not go well if you all sell the same thing. That is 
the guideline.’ ‘Each person knows their spot. We 
have rules. You know your place.’78 Myers argues in 
this vein that the integration of social networks and 
patterns of sociality into structured formal forms of 
urban development can be a poor substitute for 
previous forms of economic reciprocity and sociality.79 
In this context, formality can constitute a threat to 
social networks and patterns of sociality, and render 
the benefits derivable from it ‘doubtful or uncertain’.80 
In return for the infrastructure it has built, the VPUU 
enforces a contractual relationship with traders who 
now occupy these spaces. Many of these traders 
previously traded ‘in the sand’81 where the VPUU 
buildings are now located. 
The VPUU seeks to establish new forms of ownership 
of space, in line with classic Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) principles that 
theorise the link between urban space and crime in 
terms of the notion of ‘territoriality’, i.e. the concept 
that a sense of ownership of and responsibility for 
space can help reduce crime. However, it is exactly 
this ownership of space that is contested by traders. 
While some traders acknowledge that the VPUU did 
engage in consultative processes before the 
intervention was implemented, the organisation is still 
seen as having appropriated space that traders were 
already invested in. This space is now literally and 
symbolically owned and controlled by the VPUU: ‘The 
place they put up the building is the place we used to 
work from.’ ‘They forget that we were trading here.’82
Informal traders who currently occupy the kiosks that 
the VPUU has created did not pay for the land on 
which they traded previously, and maintain that they 
felt a sense of proprietorship and autonomy. Now 
they have to pay rent of R900 per month and are 
subject to a new regulatory regime imposed by the 
VPUU, which designates what and how they trade. 
The organisation is therefore seen to have usurped 
space previously utilised by traders, without external 
rule or regulation: ‘Keep in mind that they build in 
your spot with your business not registered.’83 A 
number of traders are now severely indebted. Most 
seem to have understood that some payment would 
be needed in compensation for the facilities, but 
allege they were not aware of how high rents would 
be. As one female trader elucidated: ‘The VPUU 
brings development, but they don’t tell us the price.’84 
The VPUU is seen by some traders to be callously 
enforcing a contractual relationship. ‘They say, “This 
is not charity.’’’85 
They just tell us, ‘vacate if you cannot afford. We 
have a list of people that want to move in.’ … if 
you cannot afford to pay rent because there is 
no business they tell you about moving out. You 
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will leave and go stay at the location and what 
will you eat?86  
While the VPUU argues that it seeks to understand 
the ‘voice’ of citizens through its baseline surveys, 
interviews with traders appear to reveal a profound 
struggle to be heard: ‘We talked and gave up.’87 ‘They 
don’t sit down and talk to the people they found here 
to find solutions.’88 ‘They just come to us only to tell 
us what they have decided to do.’89 ‘That affects you 
as the person who has been here.’90  
The rent charged to traders is in line with the 
methodology outlined by the German Development 
Bank that contends that ‘upgrading can be affordable 
when carried out jointly. Programmes show that 
even low-income residents are willing to pay for 
infrastructure services in adequate conditions.’91 The 
VPUU echoes this in its own assertions that ‘long term 
financial sustainability is central to the VPUU approach 
– to create and develop facilities and systems that are 
affordable and will pay for themselves.’92 In its 
semi-annual progress report of 2013, the VPUU notes 
the achievement of a ‘milestone’ as the fact that 
‘rental income has for the first time exceeded basic 
maintenance costs’.93 However, affordability appears 
to be a critical issue in terms of both access to 
facilities and the rental cost of trading kiosks. 
In this setting, attempting to formalise the urban 
space through urban upgrading, while beneficial, may 
disrupt complex social networks and have unintended 
consequences. The question is, how is it possible to 
fashion violence prevention initiatives around social 
cohesion that take these complex social networks into 
account, and that utilise existing community resources 
and conceptions of social solidarity?
Conclusion
It is evident that the relationship between social 
cohesion and violence plays out in multifaceted ways 
in contexts such as Khayelitsha, disputing some of 
the assumptions in international interpretations of 
social cohesion and collective efficacy. Nevertheless, 
social cohesion is relevant to understanding the 
conditions of both solidarity and violence in a city in 
the global South such as Khayelitsha. It is widely used 
in policy discourse both locally and internationally, has 
generated a body of scholarship, and most 
importantly, is shaping the way in which violence 
prevention is being understood and implemented. 
This article has therefore sought to interrogate the 
applicability of international conceptions of social 
cohesion and its relation to violence in an 
environment such as Khayelitsha. For all its limitations 
and definitional fluidity, social cohesion as a 
conceptual category that tries to capture some of the 
conditions of cohesion and citizenship in the nation-
state, does have analytical and practical value. It 
grapples with a fundamental question about how 
societies can cohere in ways that support non-violent 
forms of local and national democratic unity in a 
manner that does not stifle contention and embraces 
and mediates social pluralism. 
However, the way in which solidarity has been 
conceptualised in dominant discourses may be 
limited by presuppositions about the nature of social, 
political and economic life typical of the milieu in the 
global North. The concept therefore needs to be 
interrogated and recalibrated to take into account 
what Bourdieu calls the ‘habitus’ of citizens in the 
global South, i.e. their lifestyle, values, outlooks and 
expectations, their specific subjectivities, their forms 
of identity and their mutual relations.94 All these, often 
operating as ‘common sense’ ways of being, 
determine social practice far more powerfully than 
externally imposed norms. 
Thus, in Khayelitsha communitarian world views 
support forms of mutual sociality that are intrinsic to 
social life and identity. These are underpinned 
implicitly by the philosophy of ubuntu in which 
personhood is achieved through social relations 
rather than through individual empowerment. 
However, these communitarian networks and ‘ways 
of life’ are under social and structural strain and 
moreover are the conduits not only for reciprocity, but 
also for violence. This is an environment where 
citizens intervene on each other’s behalf, as in 
Sampson’s concept of collective efficacy, but 
frequently in order to enact what are seen as 
defensive forms of violence in a situation of 
considerable disorder, rather than to oppose violence. 
Informal networks are not channels for middle class 
forms of sociality such as the bowling clubs that 
Putnam envisaged, but instead function as vital 
regulatory mechanisms for social, economic and 
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political life in an environment where the state in 
general, and the police in particular, can be 
substantively absent as meaningful governing agents.
These conditions of informality, plurality and violence 
pose difficult questions for violence prevention 
efforts that seek to build non-violent forms of 
cohesion. What this research has revealed, however, 
is the ubiquitousness of community networks and 
world views that conceptually and practically 
support intervention and solidarity, and which 
could be mobilised for violence prevention. This is 
not to say that violence does not remain an 
authoritative source of power in private and public 
life and social networks. 
In this environment, an internationally conceptualised 
and funded intervention such as the VPUU attempts 
to avoid engaging with the ‘irregularity’ of the social 
and political environment. It instead insists on 
normative practices and subjectivities, as well as its 
own governance spaces and regulatory 
mechanisms, implicitly shaped by an assumption of 
their superiority. Citizens are delivered a ‘model’ 
that they did not substantively help formulate and 
are ‘allowed’ to participate on terms that are already 
set. However, attempts to ‘ignore’ the society in 
which the organisation is embedded in order to 
effect an ostensibly technical and neutral intervention 
founders on the unavoidable fabric of society in 
which the programme is embedded, limiting its 
ability to recognise and build on existing forms of 
social cohesion and communitarianism and to form 
a genuinely equal partnership for the prevention 
of violence.
To comment on this article visit 
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